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Transitioning  away  from  our  current  global  energy  system  is  of  paramount  importance.  The  speed  at
which  a  transition  can take  place—its  timing,  or  temporal  dynamics—is  a  critical  element  of  considera-
tion.  This  study  therefore  investigates  the  issue  of time  in global  and national  energy  transitions  by  asking:
What  does  the  mainstream  academic  literature  suggest  about  the  time  scale  of  energy  transitions?  Addi-
tionally,  what  does  some  of the  more  recent  empirical  data  related  to transitions  say,  or challenge,  about
conventional  views?  In answering  these  questions,  the  article  presents  a  “mainstream”  view  of  energyime
peed
nergy transition
ocio-technical transition
transitions  as  long,  protracted  affairs,  often  taking  decades  to  centuries  to occur.  However,  the  article  then
offers some  empirical  evidence  that  the  predominant  view  of  timing  may  not  always  be  supported  by
the  evidence.  With  this  in  mind,  the ﬁnal  part  of  the  article  argues  for more  transparent  conceptions  and
deﬁnitions  of  energy  transitions,  and  it asks  for  analysis  that recognizes  the  causal  complexity  underlying
them.
© 2015  The  Author.  Published  by  Elsevier  Ltd.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the CC  BY  license. Introduction
Transitioning away from our current global energy system is of
aramount importance [1]. As Grubler compellingly writes, “the
eed for the ‘next’ energy transition is widely apparent as current
nergy systems are simply unsustainable on all accounts of social,
conomic, and environmental criteria [2]”. And as Miller et al. add,
the future of energy systems is one of the central policy challenges
acing industrial countries [3]”. Unfortunately, however, neither
rivate markets nor government agencies seem likely to spur a
ransition on their own [4]. Moreover, transitions to newer, cleaner
nergy systems such as sources of renewable electricity [5,6] or
lectric vehicles [7,8] often require signiﬁcant shifts not only in
echnology, but in political regulations, tariffs and pricing regimes,
nd the behavior of users and adopters.
The speed at which a transition can take place—its timing, or
emporal dynamics—is a vital element of consideration. According
o the International Energy Agency, for example, if “action to reduce
O2 emissions is not taken before 2017, all the allowable CO2 emis-
 The author of this paper is an editor for Energy Research & Social Science. They
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sions would be locked-in by energy infrastructure existing at that
time [9]”. In other words, if a transition does not occur quickly, or
soon, it may  be too late. Giddens went so far as to call this the “cli-
mate paradox”, the fact that by the time humanity may  come to
fully realize how much they need to shift to low-carbon forms of
energy, they will have already passed the point of no return [10].
This study, therefore, investigates the critical issue of time in
global and national energy transitions. Although other elements of
transitions such as their scale, magnitude, direction, drivers, actors,
and mechanisms are touched upon when exploring this theme,
the article’s central purpose is to ask: What does the mainstream
academic literature suggest about the time scale of energy transi-
tions? In addition, what does some of the more recent empirical
data related to transitions say, or challenge, about the mainstream
view?
In answering these questions, the article proceeds as follows. It
begins by presenting a mainstream view of energy transitions as
long, protracted affairs, often taking decades to centuries to occur.
Part of this argument draws from the history of previous major
energy transitions such as the switch from wood to coal or coal to
oil. Part of this argument also draws on the sheer scale and com-
plexity involved in major transitions, as well as the tendency for
new systems to face the “lock-in” or “path dependency” of existing
systems. However, the article then offers some empirical evidence
that the predominant view of timing may  not always be supported
by the evidence. The second half of the paper shows that there have
der the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Table  1
Five deﬁnitions of energy transitions.
Deﬁnition Source
A change in fuels (e.g., from wood to coal or
coal to oil) and their associated technologies
(e.g., from steam engines to internal
combustion engines)
Hirsh and Jones [22]
Shifts in the fuel source for energy production
and the technologies used to exploit that fuel
Miller et al. [23]
A particularly signiﬁcant set of changes to the
patterns of energy use in a society, potentially
affecting resources, carriers, converters, and
services
O’Connor [24]
The switch from an economic system
dependent on one or a series of energy sources
and technologies to another
Fouquet and Pearson [25]
The time that elapses between the Smil [26]
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ointroduction of a new primary energy source,
or  prime mover, and its rise to claiming a
substantial share of the overall market
een many transitions—at varying scales and sectors—that have
ccurred quite quickly—that is, between a few years and a decade
r so, or within a single generation. At smaller scales, the adoption
f cookstoves, air conditioners, and ﬂex-fuel vehicles are excellent
xamples. At the state or national scale, almost complete transitions
o oil and electricity in Kuwait, natural gas in the Netherlands, and
uclear electricity in France took only a decade, roughly, to occur.
his part of the article presents ten case studies of energy tran-
itions that, in aggregate, affected almost one billion people and
eeded only 1–16 years to unfold. Clearly, this evidence suggests
hat some energy transitions can occur much more quickly than
ommonly believed.
. Energy transitions: conceptualizations from the
iterature
This section of the article presents a “mainstream” view of
nergy transitions drawn mostly from the academic and policy lit-
rature about transitions. It introduces deﬁnitions and statements
bout the timing behind transitions and discusses how the histori-
al record conﬁrms these conceptualizations. It also illustrates the
omplexity, phases, and path dependent nature of energy transi-
ions.
.1. Deﬁnitions, timing, and contextual speciﬁcity
As Table 1 reveals, although there is no standard or commonly
ccepted deﬁnition of an energy transition in the recent academic
iterature, there is a common theme within them. An energy transi-
ion most broadly involves a change in an energy system, usually to
 particular fuel source, technology, or prime mover (a device that
onverts energy into useful services, such as an automobile or tele-
ision) [11–14]. Some studies choose to focus only on the ﬁrst of
hose dimensions—fuels such as oil, coal, gas, and uranium—causing
ome to critique that they narrowly frame transitions as a way  of
oreclosing future change [15] or of masking “the social and politi-
al dimensions of energy systems behind a false veneer of limited
echnological choices [16]”. Others take a broader view that encom-
asses shifts in technology as well as the resulting “constellation
f energy inputs and outputs involving suppliers, distributors, and
nd users along with institutions of regulation, conversion and
rade [17]”, or structural changes in the way energy services are
elivered. Still others argue that the term “energy transition” is
eant to be similar to energy “transformation” or “revolution”, a
isruptive or radical transformation of both technology and social
ractices [18–20], often centered on expanding access to energy,
r abundance, but occasionally focused on scarcity [21].ial Science 13 (2016) 202–215 203
Transitions, perhaps obviously, must be measured over time,
usually from the point at which an energy system or technology
occupies a 1% market share and then grows or shrinks accordingly.
As Melosi puts it, “The concept of ‘energy transitions’ is based on
the notion that a single energy source, or group of related sources,
dominated the market during a particular period or era, eventu-
ally to be challenged and then replaced by another major source
or sources [18]”. Smil even puts a deﬁnitive threshold to his def-
inition, arguing that an energy transition refers to the time that
elapses between the introduction of a new fuel or prime mover”
and its rise to 25% of national or global market share [26]. So does
Grubler, who argues that “grand transitions” can occur when they
reach 50% of a market [27].
Complicating matters, in some circumstances what may  seem
a sweeping transition or radical transformation can actually be a
bundle of more discrete conversions. As O’Connor concludes, “Big
transitions are the sum of many small ones. Looking at overall
energy consumption will miss the small-scale changes that are the
foundation of the transitions [28]”. The big ascent of oil at the start
of the previous century, for example, can also be interpreted as a
series of less grand changes involving:
• The switch from animal power to internal combustion engines
for private vehicles, and the social rejection of electric vehicles
[29];
• The conversion of steam engines on ships and locomotives to
diesel for marine vessels and trains [30];
• The shift from candles and kerosene for lighting to oil based lamps
[31];
• The adaptation of coal boilers to oil boilers for the generation of
electric power [32];
• The exchange of wooden ﬁreplaces and coal stoves to oil and gas
furnaces in homes [33].
Similarly, a transition in the United States to air conditioning,
explored in greater detail below, was actually the result of concur-
rent innovations in air circulation, heat exchangers, heat pumps,
halocarbon refrigerants, customization and mass production, and
marketing [34]. It is occasionally these “minor transitions” that,
when they occur in a concerted manner, create the “major transi-
tions” that are so easily identiﬁable.
Sometimes, however, measuring a transition is more compli-
cated than it may  seem. An energy system can grow rapidly in an
absolute sense but still fail to grow in a comparative sense. Hydro-
electricity in the United States was a low-cost source of energy
in the 1950s and 1960s, where it grew in capacity threefold from
1949 to 1964. However, during this time, because other sources
of energy (and demand for electricity) grew faster, hydropower’s
overall national share dropped from 32% to 16%. Similarly, from
2000 to 2010, global annual investment in solar PV increased by
a factor of 16, investment in wind grew fourfold, investment in
solar heating threefold. This sounds impressive—yet the overall
contribution of solar (heating and PV) and wind to total global ﬁnal
energy consumption grew from less than one-tenth of one percent
to slightly less than 1% over the same period [35,36], a proverbial
drop in the bucket.
In other situations, the rise of an energy system may  depend, or
be mutually dependent on, another—meaning it can be a mistake to
identify or analyze a single energy system or technology by itself.
Occasionally, two  shifts have to occur to result in one combined
effect, since the one tends to require in tandem the adoption of the
other. As Fig. 1 illustrates, Grubler found this to be the case with
technologies such as the railway and the telegraph as well as the
road network for automobiles and oil pipelines [37].
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Fig. 1. Growth of Infrastructures in the United States a
Source: Ref. [38]
Table 2
The differences in timing and speed of energy transitions in Europe.
Phase-out traditional
renewables phase-in coal:
Diffusion
midpoint
Diffusion
speed
Core England 1736 160
Rim  Germany 1857 102
France 1870 107
Netherlands 1873 105
Periphery Spain 1919 111
Sweden 1922 96
Italy 1919 98
Portugal 1949 135
Phase-out coal phase-in oil/gas/electricity:
Core Portugal 1966 47
Italy 1960 65
Sweden 1963 67
Rim  Spain 1975 69
Netherlands 1962 62
France 1972 65
Periphery Germany 1984 50
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.2. Phases, path dependency, lock-in and subversion
The mainstream literature on energy transitions has also
dvanced a number of interrelated concepts that are helpful in
nderstanding why transitions are expected to take so much time.
ne of them is the notion of “phases”. Grubler has posited that
ajor European energy transitions since 1800 all went through
hases of having a core or innovation center, where that innova-
ion began, moving upward to early adopters (what he called the
im) to, lastly, the late adopters, which he classiﬁed as the periph-
ry [39]. His data suggests that the time it took to transition from
re-industrial biomass (“traditional renewables”) to coal—the time
eeded for coal to pass through all three phases of core, rim, and
eriphery—ranged from 96 to 160 years, as Table 2 reveals. The
hift again from coal to oil and electricity was more rapid, but it still
anged from 47 to 69 years for those technologies to pass through
he three phases.
During these transitions, two things are of note. One is that
 tension existed between early and late adopters, with each of
hem confronting separate sets of advantages and risks. The idea
ere is that transition or technology adoption will rarely be uni-
orm, and will occur in ﬁts and starts—leading to inconstant rates
f change. Another is that transitions can involve at times not neces-
arily “going towards” something but instead “moving away” froms a Percentage of their Maximum Network Size.
it. Or, as Grubler remarked, history in Europe reveals a pattern of
“ﬁrst in, last out; and last in, ﬁrst out” with respect to the lifecycle
of related energy technologies and systems. That is, sometimes late
adopters stick with the technology even past its point of competive-
ness or attractiveness—taking a longer time. In other situations,
early adopters overinvest in a technology and get stuck, ﬁnding it
difﬁcult to get out compared to latecomers.
Further complicating matters, Grubler hypothesized another
number of factors that can complicate—and thus extend—the time
needed for a transition to occur [37]. One is that no innovation
spreads simultaneously, instead all undergo a typical S shaped tem-
poral pattern that takes months, years, or even decades to occur.
One is that diffusion is a spatial as well as temporal phenomenon,
meaning that it will take time for an innovation or new system to
transit from the center to the periphery. One is that the density of
adoption will differ based on a variety of contextual factors, mak-
ing adoption a process of “clusters and lumps” rather than a straight
line.
Drawing from Grubler’s work, Wilson presented a conceptual-
ization of phases in his analysis of successful “scaling-up” exercises
for various prime movers and types of energy equipment such as
wind turbines, solar panels, automobiles, oil reﬁneries, and natural
gas power plants [40]. Across these various types of energy systems,
he concluded that four phases must occur in order:
• An extended period of experimentation and learning with small
unit-scale technologies and a diversity of designs, with industry
scale being generally small and diverse;
• Scaling-up at the unit level as designs are improved and
economies of scale begin to emerge;
• Scaling up at the industry level, epitomized by the phrase “sell
many, and large units in core markets” as well as a “crowding
out” of smaller competitors;
• As industry structure becomes standardized and core markets
become saturated, further industry growth is driven by global-
ization, the diffusion of a successful design from the innovation
core to rim and periphery markets.
In sum: each of these individual phases requires require
substantial time and are sequential rather than simultaneous,
explaining thus the many decades-long pace under which energy
transitions unfold [41].
Using a different approach, in his historical work Networks of
Power [42] Hughes explored the evolution of the small intercity
lighting systems of the 1880s into the regional power systems
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f the 1920s. Drawing heavily from a non-engineering approach
o systems theory, Hughes argued that the electric utility sys-
em – like all large technical systems – progressed through ﬁve
ther types of phases, each one taking a meaningful amount of
ime [43].1 First came invention and development, where inventor-
ntrepreneurs invented a product and enrolled engineers and
nancers to their project. Second came technology transfer, where
uccessful technologies were exported between societies. Third
ame system growth, where reverse salients were solved and the
ystem operators managed challenges. Fourth came momentum,
here the system acquired velocity. Fifth came style, where the
ystem operators became particularly adept at solving problems
n their own  way, creating technological differentiation. In his
ater work, Hughes elaborated that the process took a long time
decades) and also that it tended to create a path dependency
hat resists change. The “momentum” of a given system referred
o the machines, structures, and physical artifacts where capital
ad been invested in a technology; the persons whose professional
kills were attached, trained, and associated with a technology; and
he business interests and political concerns connected to a large-
cale sociotechnical system. Taken together, these elements form
he system’s rate of growth, which often accelerates. Put another
ay, large sums of labor, capital, and effort are “sunk” into existing
ocio-technical systems so that they create their own “inertia” [44]
r “lock-in” which highly resist change [45]. As Lund notes, “the
nertia of energy systems against changes is large, among others
ecause of the long investment cycles of energy infrastructures or
roduction plants [46]”.
An additional factor contributing to path dependence can be the
trategic capture, cooption, or “subversion” of a new energy sys-
em or idea. Byrne and Rich propose that rather than sit idly by and
ccept a new innovation, many incumbent actors will try to con-
ain or coopt it [47]. That is, they will concede the need for change
ut then attempt to direct resources or capital back into their own
nergy systems. One particularly pernicious practice is the suppres-
ion of patents, where some energy companies actively suppress
ew and innovative technologies that threaten to disrupt proﬁts
n a market [48–51]. Stirling also argues that energy transforma-
ions can become subverted by dominant interests—who attempt
o capture the drivers or discourses behind them with options that
ill directly beneﬁt them, with shale gas, carbon capture and stor-
ge, nuclear power, and climate change geoengineering serving as
xamples [52,53].
In order to counteract path dependence, inertia, and lock-in,
cholars looking at transitions theory have argued that truly trans-
ormative change must be the result of alterations at every level
f the system simultaneously. That is, one must alter technologies,
olitical and legal regulations, economies of scale and price signals,
nd social attitudes and values together. A widely cited theoret-
cal manifestation of these ideas is encapsulated in a framework
nown as the “multilevel perspective” on socio-technical transi-
ions and innovation [54–58]. This suggests that transitions occur
hrough interactions between three levels: the niche, the regime,
nd the landscape. The idea is that that niche-innovations often face
phill struggles against existing systems. The “landscape” refers to
xogenous developments or shocks (e.g. economic crises, demo-
raphic changes, wars, ideological change, major environmental
isruption like climate change) that create pressures on the regime,
hich in turn create windows of opportunity for the diffusion of
iche-innovations.
1 These ﬁve are modiﬁed into “seven” stages in Hughes later work. He split “inven-
ion” and “development” into separate phases and also added one on “innovation”
fter “development” and before “style.”ial Science 13 (2016) 202–215 205
A key term of art within the framework is that of a “transi-
tion pathway”. Analytically, the claim is that different kinds of
interactions between niche, regime and landscape result in differ-
ent kinds of alignments. Geels and Schot constructed a typology
based on combinations between two  dimensions: the timing and
nature of multi-level interactions [59]. This led them to distinguish
four transition pathways: (1) technological substitution, based
on disruptive niche-innovations which are sufﬁciently developed
when landscape pressure occurs, (2) transformation, in which land-
scape pressures stimulate incumbent actors to gradually adjust
the regime, when niche-innovations are not sufﬁciently devel-
oped, (3) reconﬁguration, based on symbiotic niche-innovations
that are incorporated into the regime and trigger further (archi-
tectural) adjustments under landscape pressure, (4) de-alignment
and re-alignment, in which major landscape pressures destabilize
the regime when niche-innovations are insufﬁciently developed;
the prolonged co-existence of niche-innovations is followed by re-
creation of a new regime around one of them. The implication is
that transitions are competitive – many niches fail – and that exist-
ing energy systems and infrastructure can dominate and suppress
threatening innovations.
Indeed, the idea that energy transitions will take a substantial
amount of time is embedded in no less than four major academic
theories or approaches—each with their different foci, units of
analysis, and concepts—shown in Table 3, including the multilevel
perspective as well as three others from the disciplines of envi-
ronmental science, sociology, and political ecology. Socio-technical
transitions scholars focus on how to counteract the momentum
or domination of existing systems [60,61]; ecological modernists
highlight the lengthy process of regulatory reform [62–64]; soci-
ologists underscore how altering everyday routines and practices
can take a generation [65–69]; political ecologists proclaim how
neo-liberal ideology has further entrenched capitalism into our
social and political spaces so that alternatives are rarely imag-
ined let alone implemented [70–74]. The end result is that energy
transitions, breaking out of these embedded systems, require a
“long-term transformation” that is “a messy, conﬂictual, and highly
disjointed process [75]”.
2.3. Conceptualizing the temporal dynamics of historical
transitions
Independent of these theories and concepts, the historical
record does seemingly support the mainstream view that energy
transitions all take time. In the United States crude oil took half a
century from its exploratory stages in the 1860s to capturing 10% of
the national market in the 1910s, then 30 years more to reach 25%.
Natural gas took 70 years to rise from 1% to 20% in the United States.
Coal needed 103 years to account for just 5% of total energy con-
sumed in the United States and an additional 26 years to reach 25%
[77]. Nuclear electricity took 38 years to reach a 20% share in the
United States, which occurred in 1995. As Smil points out, “It’s taken
between 50 and 70 years for a resource to reach a large penetration.
When you look at the money, the infrastructure, the regulation, the
technologies, it takes many decades for any fuel source to make a
large impact [78]”.
At the global scale, we see even longer timeframes involved with
energy transitions, illustrated by Fig. 2. Coal surpassed the 25% mark
in 1871, more than ﬁve hundred years after the ﬁrst commercial
coalmines were developed in England. Crude oil surpassed the same
mark in 1953, about nine decades after Edwin Drake drilled the ﬁrst
commercial well in Titusville, Pennsylvania, in 1859. Hydroelectric-
ity, natural gas, nuclear power, and “other” sources such as wind
turbines and solar panels still have yet to surpass the 25% threshold.
Assessing prime movers rather than fuels, Smil adds that steam
engines were designed in the 1770s, but did not take off until the
206 B.K. Sovacool / Energy Research & Social Science 13 (2016) 202–215
Table  3
Four key conceptual approaches to understanding energy transitions.
Socio-technical transitions Ecological modernization
theory
Sociology and social
practice theory
Political ecology
Related academic
disciplines
Science and technology
studies, evolutionary
economics, structuration
theory
Environmental science,
environmental sociology,
policy studies
Sociology, anthropology,
cultural theory
Human geography,
ecology, political
geography
Primary focus The development or
introduction of new
technologies leading to
new socio-technical
conﬁgurations
Environmental regulation,
reform, and governance
Everyday routines and
practices
Conﬂict over natural
resources and opposition
to change
Themes Transition pathways,
momentum, path
dependency, carbon
lock-in, resistance by
incumbents
Energy transitions,
environmental reform, risk
society, social movements
Changing practices, habits,
socialization,
normalization
Contestation, enclosure
and exclusion,
accumulation by
dispossession, global
production networks,
neoliberalism
Units  of analysis Socio-technical systems,
niches, regimes, and
landscapes
Sectors, industries,
institutions
Everyday practices or
discourses
Ecological change, local
communities, institutions
Selected key authors Frank Geels, Johan Schot,
Arie Rip, Frans Berkhout,
René Kemp, Wim  A. Smit,
Thomas Hughes
Ulrich Beck, Maarten Hajer,
APJ Mol, FH Buttel, Richard
York, Martin Jaenicke
Elizabeth Shove, Gordon
Walker, Loren Lutzenhiser,
Harold Wilhite
David Harvey, Michael
Watts, Paul Robbins, James
McCarthy, Gavin Bridge
Source: Modiﬁed from Ref. [76,171]
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800s, and the gasoline powered internal combustion engine, ﬁrst
eployed by Benz, Maybach, and Daimler in the middle of the 1880s,
eached widespread acceptance in the United States only in the
920s, even later for Europe and Japan. As Smil deduces from these
xamples, which tend to refer to large nations with high per capita
nergy use:
Energy transitions have been, and will continue to be, inherently
prolonged affairs, particularly so in large nations whose high levels
of per capita energy use and whose massive and expensive infras-
tructures make it impossible to greatly accelerate their progress
even if we were to resort to some highly effective interventions...
[81].
This is why he calls energy systems “a slow-maturing resource”
nd jokes that “energy sources, they grow up so . . . slowly [77]”.
nalogously, Fouquet studied various transitions between both
nergy fuels and energy services from 1500 to 1920, and foundy such as wind, solar, and geothermal.
that, on average, each single transition had an innovation phase
exceeding 100 years followed by a diffusion phase approaching 50
years [82].
The argument that historical energy transitions are inherently
lengthy events ﬁnds further support from energy analysts looking
at the innovation or diffusion of prime movers or speciﬁc technolo-
gies. Lund, looking at prime movers, found that market penetration
of new energy systems or technologies can take as long as 70 years
[83]. Short “take-over times” of less than 25 years are limited to
a few end-use technologies such as water heaters or refrigerators,
and are not common for major infrastructural systems like those
involving electricity or transport. Edmonds testiﬁed to U.S. senators
that:Given that it takes decades to go from “energy research” to the prac-
tical application of the research within some commercial “energy
technology” and then perhaps another three to four decades before
that technology is widely deployed throughout the global energy
 & Social Science 13 (2016) 202–215 207
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market, we will likely have to [combat global warming] with tech-
nologies that are already developed [84].
Gorte and Kaarsberg also remark that research and development
n energy technologies “usually takes years to pay off . . . the piper
s paid ﬁve, ten, or more years in the future [85]”.
Thus, when many scholars conceptualize the temporal dynam-
cs of a historical or even future transition, they presume that shifts
nd changes will take many, many years, since so many discrete
lterations need to accumulate and align. As Smil remarks, “it is
mpossible to displace [the world’s fossil-fuel-based energy] super-
ystem in a decade or two—or ﬁve, for that matter. Replacing it with
n equally extensive and reliable alternative based on renewable
nergy ﬂows is a task that will require decades of expensive com-
itment. It is the work of generations of engineers [77]”. In another
rticle, Smil writes that “all energy transitions have one thing in
ommon: They are prolonged affairs that take decades to accom-
lish, and the greater the scale of prevailing uses and conversions,
he longer the substitutions will take [86]”. One review of fourteen
istorical transitions concluded that “the process from technolog-
cal innovation to niche market to dominance took a minimum of
0 years” for single systems and that “an aggregate energy transi-
ion, involving the entire economy, could take centuries [87]”. As
rubler echoed in his review of the literature, “The fact that his-
orical energy transitions have taken many decades, even above a
entury to unfold is a by now widely shared insight [88]”. Fouquet
nd Perason opine that energy transitions “have in the past tended
o be relatively rare events whose complex and long drawn-out
rocesses unfolded over decades and sometimes centuries [89]”.
he Global Energy Assessment, a major international, interdisci-
linary effort to better understand energy systems in 2012, notes
hat “transformations in energy systems” are “long-term change
rocesses” on the scale of decades or even centuries [90]. This view
olds that, as two Stanford University scientists write, “it appears
hat there is no quick ﬁx; energy system transitions are intrinsically
low [91]”. Grubb et al. [92] Allen [93], and Rubio and Folchi [94]
lso each argue that energy transitions are gradual and sluggish
rocesses that take upwards of 75 or even 130 years to occur. Fast
ransitions, when they occur at all, are considered anomalies, lim-
ted to countries with very small populations or unique contextual
ircumstances that can hardly be replicated elsewhere.
. The timing of energy transitions: conﬂicting evidence
Contrary to the legitimate reasons and arguments presented in
avor of the longevity of energy transitions, some empirical data
uggests that under certain conditions, they can occur rather speed-
ly. This data tends to support three arguments in favor of rapid
ransition: (1) we have seen fast transitions in terms of energy
nd-use and prime movers, (2) examples of rapid national-scale
ransitions in energy supply do populate the historical record, (3)
he drivers of future transitions may  differ fundamentally from
he drivers of historical transitions; we can sufﬁciently learn from
revious trends so that favorable future energy transitions can be
xpedited.
The ﬁrst part of this section of the article explores no less than
en “quick” energy transitions – broadly deﬁned – ﬁve of them
ocused on end-use devices such as lighting and air conditioning,
ve of them focused on national energy, electricity, or heating sys-
ems such as oil and electricity in Kuwait, cogeneration in Denmark,
nd nuclear power in France. Table 4 provides an overview of these
ases, which collectively impacted more than 967 million people.
s Araujo writes, “countries can, in fact, alter their energy balance
n a signiﬁcant way – stressing low carbon energy sources – in
uch less time than many decision-makers might imagine. Critical
ubstitution shifts within [Brazil, France, Denmark, and Iceland]Fig. 3. Market Change and Market Share of Energy-Efﬁcient Ballasts in Sweden,
1986–2000.
Source: Ref. [98]
were accomplished often in less than 15 years. Moreover, these
transitions were effectuated even amidst circumstances at times
involving highly complex energy technologies [95]”.
3.1. Rapid transitions in prime movers
At least ﬁve transitions in end-use devices, or prime movers,
have occurred with remarkable rapidity: lighting in Sweden, cook-
stoves in China, liqueﬁed petroleum gas stoves in Indonesia,
ethanol vehicles in Brazil, and air conditioning in the United States.
Sweden was able to phase in an almost complete shift to energy
efﬁcient lighting in commercial buildings in about 9 years. Swedish
Energy Authorities arranged for the procurement of high-frequency
electronic ballasts for lights in ofﬁce buildings, commercial enter-
prises, schools, and hospitals, which saved 30–70% compared to
ordinary ballasts, in 1991 [96]. They used a multi-pronged approach
of standardization and quality assurance, direct procurement,
stakeholder involvement, and demonstrations to disseminate those
ballasts. They began by collaborating with experts to develop a
list of lighting quality factors for commercial buildings, and then
asked for competitive tenders from manufacturers that met  these
standards. Then, the government directly purchased almost 30,000
units in a pilot phase, and worked with real estate management
companies (for new buildings) and owners of public, commer-
cial and industrial buildings (for retroﬁts) to ensure that they
were installed [97]. After the pilot phase, they promoted distri-
bution through government subsidies, sponsored demonstrations
of the technology among the commercial sector, and involved con-
sumer groups in discounted bulk purchases. Due to these concerted
efforts, self-supporting volume effects were reached as early as
1996, catalyzing very rapid market penetration which jumped from
about 10% that year to almost 70% by 2000 (the last year Lund
analyzed)—growth exhibited by Fig. 3 . In essence, this meant that
between 1991 and 2000, 2.3 million Swedish workers experienced
changes in the lights at their ofﬁces.
The Chinese Ministry of Agriculture sponsored an even more
impressive National Improved Stove Program (NISP), managed
by the Bureau of Environmental Protection and Energy (BEPE),
from 1983 to 1998 [99,100]. The BEPE adopted a “self-building,
self-managing, self-using” policy focused on having rural people
themselves invent, distribute, and care for energy-efﬁcient cook-
stoves, and it set up pilot programs in hundreds of rural provinces.
From the start of the program until 1998, the NISP was responsible
for the installation of 185 million improved cookstoves and facili-
tated the penetration of improved stoves from less than one 1% of
the Chinese market in 1982 to more than 80% by 1998—reaching
half a billion people, as Table 5 shows. The cookstoves being
installed in China in 1994, during the height of the program,
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Table  4
Overview of rapid energy transitions.
Country Technology/fuel Market or sector Period of transition Number of years from
1  to 25% market share
Approximate size (population
affected in millions of people)
Sweden Energy-efﬁcient ballasts Commercial buildings 1991–2000 7 2.3
China  Improved cookstoves Rural households 1983–1998 8 592
Indonesia Liqueﬁed petroleum gas stoves Urban and rural
households
2007–2010 3 216
Brazil  Flex-fuel vehicles New automobile sales 2004–2009 1 2
United States Air conditioning Urban and rural
households
1947–1970 16 52.8
Kuwait Crude oil and electricity National energy supply 1946–1955 2 0.28
Netherlands Natural gas National energy supply 1959–1971 10 11.5
France Nuclear electricity Electricity 1974–1982 11 72.8
Denmark Combined heat and power Electricity and heating 1976–1981 3 5.1
Canada
(Ontario)a
Coal Electricity 2003–2014 11 13
a The Ontario case study is the inverse, showing how quickly a province went from 25% coal supply to zero.
Table 5
Households adopting improved stoves under the Chinese NISP and afﬁliated provincial programs.
NISP households (million) Households under provincial programs (million) Total households/year (million) Total people/year (million)
1983 2.6 4 6.6 21.1
1984  11 9.7 20.7 66.2
1985  8.4 9.5 17.9 57.3
1986  9.9 8.5 18.4 58.9
1987  8.9 9.1 18 57.6
1988  10 7.5 17.5 56
1989  4.5 5 9.5 30.4
1990  3.6 7.8 11.4 36.5
1991–1998 7.8 57.2 65 208
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Fig. 4. Flex-Fuel Vehicle Sales as a Percentage of Overall New Car Sales in Brazil,Total  66.7 118.3 
ource: Ref. [100]
ere equivalent to 90% of all improved stoves installed globally.
s a consequence, although substitution was never complete—all
xisting inefﬁcient cookstoves were never replaced, just most of
hem—Chinese energy use per capita declined in rural areas at an
nnual rate of savings of 5.6% from 1983 to 1990.
Indonesia also ran a large household energy program focusing
n the conversion from kerosene stoves to liqueﬁed petroleum
as (LPG) stoves to improve air quality. Under leadership from
heir Vice President Jusuf Kalla, the Indonesian “LPG Megapro-
ect” offered households the right to receive a free “initial package”
onsisting of a 3 kg LPG cylinder, a ﬁrst free gas-ﬁll, one burner
tove, a hose, and a regulator. The government, in tandem, low-
red kerosene subsidies (increasing its price) and constructed new
efrigerated LPG terminals to act as national distribution hubs.
mazingly, in just 3 years – from 2007 to 2009 – the number of LPG
toves nationwide jumped from a mere 3 million to 43.3 million,
eaning they served almost two-thirds of Indonesia’s 65 million
ouseholds (or about 216 million people). Six entire provinces,
ncluding that of Jakarta, the capital, were declared “closed and
ry”, meaning that the program reached all of its targets, and that
ll kerosene subsidies were withdrawn [101].
Brazil has perhaps the fastest energy transition on record,
hough (to be fair) it depends on what one counts. Brazil created its
roálcool program in November 1975 to increase ethanol produc-
ion and substitute ethanol for petroleum in conventional vehicles,
nd in 1981, six years later, 90% of all new vehicles sold in Brazil
ould run on ethanol—an impressive feat. However, a more recent
ransition, connected in part to the Proálcool program, is even more
oteworthy. The Brazilian government started incentivizing ﬂex-
uel vehicles (FFVs) in 2003 through reduced tax rates and fuel
axes. These Brazilian FFVs were capable of running on any blend
f ethanol from 0 to 100%, giving drivers the option of switching
etween various blends of gasoline and ethanol depending on price
nd convenience. The ﬁrst year FFVs entered the market in 20042004–2009.
Source: Modiﬁed from Ref. [102]
they accounted for 17% of new car sales but they rapidly jumped
to 90% in 2009—as Fig. 4 illustrates—meaning 2 million FFVs were
purchased in total over the ﬁrst ﬁve years of the program [102].
Air conditioning in the United States is a ﬁnal example. In
1947, mass-produced, low-cost window air conditioners became
possible, enabling many people to enjoy air conditioning without
the need to buy a new home or completely renovate their heat-
ing system [103]. That year, only 43,000 units were sold, but by
1953 the number had jumped to one million, as air conditioners
became endorsed by builders eager to mass produce affordable,
yet desirable, modern homes and electric utilities that wanted to
increase electricity consumption throughout the growing suburbs
[104]. Consequently, more than 12% of people (occupying 6.5 mil-
lion housing units) reported to the U.S. Census in 1960 that they
owned an air conditioner, rising to 25% in 1963 and 35.8% in 1970,
representing 24.2 million homes and more than 50 million people
[105,106]. Since then, the presence of air conditioning in single-
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(1972 MW),  and Nanticoke (3945 MW)  from 2007 to 2014. Coal
generation thus declined from 25% of provincial supply in 2003 to
15% in 2008, 3% in 2011, and 0% in 2014. The primary justiﬁcationB.K. Sovacool / Energy Research
amily homes jumped from 49% in 1973 to 87% in 2009 [107]. In
ot and humid places such as Southern Florida, its use grew from
ve percent in 1950 to 95% in 1990. American motorists also use up
–10 billion gallons of gasoline annually to air condition their cars.
n aggregate, the United States on an annual basis now consumes
ore electricity for air conditioning than the entire continent of
frica consumes for all electricity uses [108]. Or, in other terms,
he United States currently utilizes more energy (about 185 billion
Wh) for air-conditioning than all other countries’ air conditioning
sage combined [109].
.2. Rapid transitions in energy supply
Empirical data also points to ﬁve other transitions in supply that
ave occurred at the national level: to crude oil and electricity in
uwait, natural gas in the Netherlands, nuclear electricity in France,
ombined heat and power in Denmark, and coal retirements in
ntario, Canada.
Two concurrent modiﬁcations, in electricity and transport, cat-
lyzed an almost complete shift in Kuwait’s national energy proﬁle
n about 9 years. Oil use catapulted from constituting a negligi-
le amount of total national energy supply in 1946 to 25% in 1947
nd above 90% in 1950 [110]. In 1938, when Kuwait was still a
mall, impoverished British protectorate, geologists discovered the
urgan oilﬁeld, which proved to be the world’s second largest accu-
ulation of oil following Saudi Arabia’s Ghawar oil ﬁeld [111].
ommercial exploitation began in earnest in 1946 after a suspen-
ion of operations due to World War  II, increasing from 5.9 million
arrels that year to 16.2 million barrels in 1947 and almost 400
illion barrels in 1955, in tandem with the development of other
il ﬁelds [112]. Within ﬁve years – 1945 to 1949 – the Kuwaiti oil
ndustry was transformed from one dependent on ﬁve gallon bar-
els being distributed manually to customers, carried on camels,
onkeys, or wooden push carts to one characterized by huge vol-
mes and scale economies that were dependent on motorized
rucks and tankers, pipelines, and ﬁlling stations [113].
Simultaneously, Kuwait began using oil for electricity gener-
tion. The Kuwait Oil Company obtained and commissioned its
rst 500 kW generator in 1951 and in 1952 built a 2.25 MW Steam
ower Station at Al-Shewaikh, essentially tripling national electric-
ty capacity in three years [114]. Demand for such electricity grew
onsiderably, doubling again by 1960 and then increasing (in per
apita terms) from about 1500 kWh  to more than 9200 kWh  in 1985
115]. Thereafter a rapid expansion of distillation units, reﬁner-
es, petrol stations, and the establishment of the Kuwait National
etroleum Company in 1960, the same year Kuwait helped form
he Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, saw oil’s rise
ontinue so that in 1965 Kuwait became the world’s fourth largest
roducer of oil (behind the United States, USSR, and Venezuela, and
head of Saudi Arabia) [81]. As even energy transition skeptic Smil
oncedes, “in energy terms Kuwait thus moved from a pre-modern
ociety dependent on imports of wood, charcoal, and kerosene to
n oil superpower in a single generation [81]”.
The Netherlands—thanks in large part to the discovery of a giant
roningen natural gas ﬁeld in 1959—started a rapid transition away
rom oil and coal to natural gas [81]. That year, coal supplied about
5% of Dutch primary energy supply followed by crude oil at 43%
nd natural gas less than 2%. In December 1965, however, one year
fter gas deliveries began from Groningen, natural gas supplied 5%
f the Netherland’s primary energy, rising quickly to 50% by 1971.
o facilitate the transition, the government decided in December
965 to abandon all coal mining in the Limburg province within a
ecade, doing away with some 75,000 mining related jobs impact-
ng more than 200,000 people. What made the transition successful
as that the government strategically steered it [116], implement-
ng countermeasures such as subsidies for new businesses, theial Science 13 (2016) 202–215 209
relocation of government industries from the capital to regions of
the country hardest hit by the mine closures, retraining programs
for miners, and offering shares in Groningen to Staatsmijnen (the
state mining company). After its peak output in the mid-1970s,
extraction of gas at Groningen was  purposely scaled back to maxi-
mize the lifetime of the ﬁeld, though natural gas continued to play
a prominent role in the nation’s energy mix. In 2010, for instance,
natural gas still provided 45% of total primary energy supply, larger
than any other source [117].
The French transition to nuclear power was  also swift. Following
the oil crisis in 1974, Prime Minister Pierre Messmer announced a
large nuclear power program intended to generate all of France’s
electricity from nuclear reactors to displace the Republic’s heavy
dependence on imported oil. As the maxim went at the time, “No
coal, no oil, no gas, no choice! [95]”. The “Messmer Plan” proposed
the construction of 80 nuclear power plants by 1985 and 170 plants
by 2000. Work commenced on three plants – Tricastin, Gravelines,
and Dampierre – immediately following the announcement of the
plan and France ended up constructing 56 reactors from 1974 to
1989. As a result, nuclear power grew from 4% of national elec-
tricity supply in 1970 to 10% in 1978 and almost 40% by 1982. As
Grubler has noted, “the reasons for this success lay in a unique
institutional setting allowing centralized decision-making, regula-
tory stability, dedicated efforts for standardized reactor designs and
a powerful nationalized utility, EDF, whose substantial in-house
engineering resources enabled it to act as principal and agent of
reactor construction simultaneously [118]”.
Though Denmark is perhaps more famous for a transition to
wind energy, a far more accelerated transition occurred in the
1970s and 1980s. This transition involved two sets of changes, from
oil to coal as a fuel for electricity and from individual to district
heating in heating. Before 1974, almost all heating in Denmark
was provided by fuel oil, which meant the oil crisis had particu-
larly painful impacts on the country’s economy [119]. The Danish
Energy Policy of 1976 therefore articulated the short-term goal of
reducing oil dependence, and it stated the importance also of build-
ing a “diversiﬁed supply system” and meeting two-thirds of total
heat consumption with “collective heat supply” by 2002. More-
over, it sought to reduce oil dependence to 20%, an ambitious goal
that involved the conversion of 800,000 individual oil boilers from
natural gas and coal. In a mere ﬁve years – from 1976 to 1981 –
Danish electricity production changed from 90% oil-based to 95%
coal-based. Stipulations in favor of combined heat and power (CHP)
were further strengthened by the 1979 Heat Supply Act, whose
purpose was to “promote the best national economic use of energy
for heated buildings and supplying them with hot water and to
reduce the country’s dependence on mineral oil”. As a result, CHP
production increased from trivial amounts in 1970 to supply 61%
of national electricity and 77% of the country’s district heating in
2010.2
A ﬁnal example is intriguing because rather than transitioning
towards something, it involves transitioning away. In 2003, the gov-
ernment of Ontario committed to retiring all coal-ﬁred electricity
generation by 2007, something they did accomplish, albeit a few
years behind schedule. Ontario’s oldest coal plant, the 1140 MW
Lakeview facility, was closed in April 2005 followed by sequential
closures of Thunder Bay (306 MW),  Atikokan (211 MW),  Lambton2 As an aside, national planners managed a third transition, away from coal, in the
1990s, when the Danish parliament passed the “coal stop,” functionally outlawing
the construction of new coal ﬁred power stations, with exceptions given only to two
450 MW plants.
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or the closure, apart from its obvious climate change beneﬁts, was
ublic health. A government study estimated that shifting away
rom coal would reduce some 330,000 related illnesses and more
han 700 deaths related to coal pollution to fewer than 6 deaths and
nly 2460 illnesses. Put into monetary terms, the “coal switch” was
stimated to save $4.4 billion per year in health, environmental,
nd ﬁnancial damages along with $95 million in displaced operat-
ng and maintenance costs [120]. To achieve this transition, Ontario
nvested more than $21 billion in cleaner sources of energy includ-
ng wind, hydroelectricity, solar, and nuclear power, as well as
11 billion in transmission and distribution upgrades and other
nvestments in energy efﬁciency [121]. Ontario is on track to see
enewable sources of electricity grow to 46% of supply by 2025,
nd typical residential customers are expected to save $520 on their
ills, and large industrial customers to save $3 million each on their
ills, from 2013 to 2017 [121].
.3. Re-conceptualizing the temporal dynamics of future
ransitions
The ten examples above—ﬁve covering prime movers, ﬁve cov-
ring changes in supply—do cast some doubt on mainstream
onceptions that transitions must invariably take decades to occur.
ndeed, although previous, historical transitions may  have taken a
reat deal of time, the argument runs that we have learned a suf-
cient amount from them so that contemporary, or future, energy
ransitions can be expedited. Future transitions may  also become
 social or political priority in ways that previous transitions have
ot been—that is, previous transitions may  have been accidental
r circumstantial, whereas future transitions could become more
lanned and coordinated, or backed by aggressive social move-
ents or progressive government targets. This section of the paper
iscusses three signiﬁcant drivers behind the possibility of accel-
rated future transitions: scarcity, climate change, and innovation.
First, unlike earlier transitions driven primarily by price or an
bundance of resources, future ones may  be driven by scarcity
nd the unaffordability of resources. Consider crude oil. Sorrel
t al. examined oil ﬁeld-size, reserve growth and decline rates, and
epletion rates for the entire industry [122]. They concluded that,
s a global average:
The (reserve diminishment) rate of post-peak ﬁelds is at least
6.5%/year and the corresponding decline rate of all currently pro-
ducing ﬁelds is at least 4%/year. Both are on an upward trend
as more giant ﬁelds enter decline, as production shifts towards
smaller, younger and offshore ﬁelds and as changing production
methods lead to more rapid post-peak decline. More than two thirds
of current crude oil production capacity may need to be replaced
by 2030, simply to keep production constant. At best, this is likely
to prove extremely challenging.
Numerous other studies suggest that resource peaks are immi-
ent, if not already present. One assessment of the “most likely
cenarios” estimated that global oil production peaked in 2015,
hat natural gas production would peak in 2035, and that coal
roduction would peak in 2052—forming the bell-shaped curves
n production illustrated by Fig. 5 [123]. Similar peaks in supply
ave been conﬁrmed by multiple, independent analyses under-
aken by some of the world’s best geologists, economists, and
nergy analysts for oil and natural gas [124–128], coal [129–136],
nd even uranium [137,138]. British Petroleum, hardly a source
iased against fossil fuels, estimated in 2014 that global reserve to
roduction ratios for oil, natural gas and coal were 53.3 years, 55.1
ears and 113 years, respectively [139].
Even if such peaks in supply are exaggerated or uncertain,
here is also the possibility of peaks in demand—of demand-driven
carcity. Put another way, “demand peaks” can quickly exert changeFig. 5. Projected Global Peaks in Production for Oil, Gas, and Coal, 1850–2250.
Source: Ref. [140]
on “supply-side” energy technologies, altering their conﬁgurations
in ways unheard of before. Many studies support such a contention
about rapid shifts in demand for fossil fuels. One research team,
for instance, predicted that the inﬂated prices for petroleum that
are expected this century could practically bankrupt the iron, fertil-
izer, and air transport industries [141]. Citi Bank, a global ﬁnancial
ﬁrm, declared in 2013 that global oil demand was  “approaching a
tipping point” and that “the end is nigh” for growth due to substi-
tution trends of natural gas for oil coupled with improvements in
the fuel economy of vehicles [142].
Second, speedy future transitions may  be necessary to avoid the
social and environmental costs stemming from unabated climate
change. This second major driver relates to environmental carrying
capacity limits. Whether we choose to acknowledge it or not, pro-
ponents of this view hold that humanity must undertake economic
activities subject to a “carbon budget.” At a certain level of green-
house gas emissions, we  cannot afford to utilize more fossil fuels,
even if they were free [143]. As Hansen and his colleagues have
noted, “Burning all fossil fuels would produce a different, practi-
cally uninhabitable, planet [144]”. Thus, many barrels of oil, cubic
meters of natural gas, and tons of coal will need to stay in the ground
as “stranded assets [145,146]”. One study examined the volumes
of oil that “cannot be used” by 2035 due to carbon restraints and
projected that 500–600 billion barrels must be “unburnable” and
that 40–55% of new deep-water resources must not be developed
[147]. Even if geologic or economic peaks were avoidable, these
folks argue, the threat of climate change forces a retreat from fossil
fuel consumption [126]–it requires a fast, and eventually complete
transition.
Third, technological learning and innovation can result in
new technologies and systems with the potential for exponential
growth. Former United States Vice President Al Gore encapsulated
this type of thinking when he argued, in 2008, that “today I chal-
lenge our nation to commit to producing 100% of our electricity
from renewable energy and truly clean carbon-free sources within
10 years [148]”. Gore went on to say that a complete change in
energy production was  “achievable, affordable and transformative”
within the course of one decade. His thinking rested on the assump-
tion that innovations in both technology and policy design can
accelerate technological change, and achieve an energy transition,
in ways not possible even just a few decades ago.
For example, previous transitions such as that from wood to
coal or coal to oil occurred without the accumulation of knowl-
edge we have currently about the sociology, politics, and economics
of energy transitions, i.e., without the complex historical analyses
conducted by the likes of Smil, Grubler, Wilson, Hughes, and Fou-
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Kuwait, and natural gas in the Netherlands) primarily diffused their
beneﬁts to governments and private corporate actors in the form
of economic rents. Put another way, some transitions were quickB.K. Sovacool / Energy Research
uet. Because we now possess this knowledge, we  can apply it going
orward to minimize the unnecessary lag or delay of a future energy
ransition. Even Fouquet and Perason write that “past energy tran-
itions may  not be the best analogies for a future low carbon energy
ransition [149]”. Why? In part, we now possess better knowl-
dge about the co-beneﬁts of low-carbon supply including less
ir pollution and improved public health, economic diversiﬁcation,
nd enhanced national competitiveness [150–152]. We  have bet-
er causal models and analysis of how transitions occur and are
eginning to establish methodologies and policy prescriptions for
ow to manage future transitions [153–157]. We  now have newly
eveloped policy mechanisms such as production tax credits, feed-
n tariffs, and renewable portfolio standards that can hasten the
doption of preferred technologies [158]. And, many newer energy
echnologies can provide multiple energy services at once, such
s microhydro dams (which can provide mechanical energy for
gricultural processing, electricity, and irrigation simultaneously)
159], TEG cookstoves (which can provide both heat for cooking and
mall amounts of electricity) [160] or tri-generation (electric gen-
rators that can provide electricity, heat, and cooling at the same
ime) [161]. Each of these new systems can replace two  or three
reviously distinct devices, and operate more like general purpose
echnologies.
For these reasons, perhaps future energy transitions, because
hey can draw on synergistic advances in multiple domains at
nce—cutting across multiplicity of energy services, materials
cience, computing, combustion dynamics, gasiﬁcation, nanotech-
ology, biological and genetic engineering, 3D printing and the
ndustrial internet—can truly be accelerated in ways that past tran-
itions have (generally) not been, despite the fact that it may  be
carcity or concerns about climate change, rather than abundance
r price, driving them. “Accelerated diffusion” can become the
orm, not the exception.
. Conclusion and policy implications
This ﬁnal part of the paper offers four conclusions for energy
nalysts and practitioners.
First, at a basic level, whether an energy transition can occur
uickly or slowly can depend in great deal about how it is deﬁned.
ome core deﬁnitional issues include:
Different interpretations of “signiﬁcant”. Signiﬁcance may  pre-
sume large absolute magnitude or share with respect to a
particular energy sector (narrow such as cooking and household
electricity, or new commercial lighting systems, or broad such
as entire energy supply or all buildings). Signiﬁcance can also be
subjective, with good social science usually asking “signiﬁcant for
whom?”;
Different interpretation of “in a society”. This may  refer to the
world as a whole, a group of countries, one country (small or
large), part of a country (Ontario) or a particular segment of pop-
ulation (e.g. low-income peasants in China, new car purchasers
in Brazil, ofﬁce workers in Sweden);
Different interpretations of “resources, carriers, converters and
services”. Many historic analyses of energy transitions looked
for situations when all of these were signiﬁcantly affected (e.g.
substituting coal with oil affected not only the type of miner-
als being extracted, but also distribution infrastructure, reﬁning,
types of vehicles and engines, mobility patterns of population
heating, electricity generation, urban development, etc.). In con-
trast, switching from kerosene to LPG in Indonesia had a much
more conﬁned effect on resources, carriers, converters and ser-
vices. Switching to FFVs in Brazil did not affect services and
converters (FFVs have a similar engine) and may  or may  not affectial Science 13 (2016) 202–215 211
resources or carriers (depending on whether people ﬁll their FFVs
with conventional fuel or alcohol).3
Such deﬁnitional assumptions and demarcations are not always
clear in the academic literature, yet they are important, for they
capture how transitions are framed and also propagated rhetori-
cally to the public [162].
Second, timing of a transition can be subjective. Sometimes the
“speed” at which an energy transition occurs has less to do with
what actually happened and more to do with what or when one
counts [163]. The American transition to oil, according to Smil, took
about 80 years to reach a 25% share, yet during the most acceler-
ated phase of that transition—from 1990 to 1925—oil grew from
2.4% of national energy supply to 24%, justifying those who would
call it “quick [164]”. For air conditioning, whether one takes the
time of ﬁrst conception (Nikola Tesla developed electric motors that
made possible the invention of oscillating fans in 1885), ﬁrst inven-
tion (Willis Carrier invented the ﬁrst modern system in 1902), or
ﬁrst successful commercial application (when Henry Galson devel-
oped an affordable mass produced system in 1947) greatly alters
the perceived rate of market penetration [165]. Brazil’s transition
to ﬂex-fuel vehicles, arguably, took a year (from the start of the
national program to large-scale diffusion), more than twenty years
(from the ﬁrst invention of a FFV in 1980), almost thirty years (from
the start of their national ethanol program), or more than eight
decades (from the ﬁrst invention of a Brazilian engine capable of
using ethanol in the 1920s).
In the case of national transitions, we  see similar ambiguity.
Kuwait’s transition to oil can be said to have begun in 1934, with
the ﬁrst concession given to the Kuwait Oil Company; or in 1937,
when the ﬁrst exploratory wells were drilled in the Burgan ﬁeld;
or in 1946, when commercial production began (the starting point
taken here); or even in 1949, when the ﬁrst reﬁnery was estab-
lished. Similarly the French nuclear power program could have
defensibly begun in 1942 with the ﬁrst chain reaction under the
Manhattan project; or in 1945, with the formation of the Commis-
sariat à l’Énergie Atomique; or in 1948, when their ﬁrst research
reactor was commissioned; or in 1974 with the launch of the Mess-
mer Plan (taken here). Deciding what one counts includes within
it normative assumptions about what an energy transition is; the
problem is that analysts do not always make these assumptions
transparent.
Third, adding to the difﬁculty of deﬁning and dating them,
energy transitions are complex, and irreducible to a single cause,
factor, or blueprint. They can be inﬂuenced by endogenous fac-
tors within a country, like aggressive planning in China, Denmark,
Indonesia, the Netherlands, Ontario or Sweden, intensiﬁed by polit-
ical will and stakeholder involvement, or exogenous factors outside
of a country, such as military conﬂict (the World Wars spawning the
French nuclear program, their cessation enabling Kuwait to invest
in oil ﬁelds), a major energy accident (Chernobyl, Fukushima), or
some global crisis (the oil shocks of the 1970s, the collapse of
communism in the early 1990s, climate change today). Other tran-
sitions, such as the adoption of air conditioning, can be almost
entirely market driven. Some can offer ﬁnancial or social beneﬁts
to early adopters—cooler homes for the owners of air condition-
ing, improved health for cookstove users, savings at the pump for
FFV drivers—whereas others (such as nuclear power in France, oil in3 Also, the Brazilian case is rather incremental technological substitution rather
than systemic change towards a more sustainable transport system involving walk-
ing, cycling, integration of multi-modal forms of transport, and so on.
2  & Soc
b
n
o
o
a
s
t
K
g
t
a
w
D
p
e
f
n
t
P
I
r
b
o
t
a
t
m
m
m
o
i
i
w
t
l
c
m
w
s
p
t
m
“
w
c
m
s
(
a
c
t
t
b
b
g
t
o
n
v
s
m12 B.K. Sovacool / Energy Research
ecause they were managed or incentivized; others were more
aturally occurring as a function of changes in technology, price,
r consumer demand. Some beneﬁted homeowners or consumers,
thers beneﬁtted corporations or governments.
This makes each of the ten rapid case studies examined unique
nd context dependent. Some were about discrete artifacts (e.g.
toves, air conditioners, cars), which are perhaps easier to diffuse
han entire systems. Quite a few are in small countries: Denmark,
uwait, the Netherlands, Ontario and Sweden. Many have special
overnance characteristics: communist China, Brazil under mili-
ary dictatorship, Sweden with a corporatist economy, Denmark
nd its socialist communes, and centrally planned France. Some
ere based on special natural resource discoveries: natural gas in
enmark and the Netherlands, oil in Kuwait, wind, solar and hydro
otential in Ontario. Each case has certain speciﬁcities that help
xplain the rapidity of transition.
The implication here is that energy transitions have no magic
ormula. The United Kingdom, for instance, had the same access to
atural gas that the Netherlands did, yet it was unable to cultivate
he same type of changeover [81]. Countries throughout the Asia-
aciﬁc have access to the same LPG stove technology that exists in
ndonesia but have not seen widespread adoption [166]. The expe-
ience of tiny, afﬂuent countries such as Denmark and Kuwait may
e relevant for countries in a similar class (such as Belgium, Brunei,
r Qatar), but less so for an India or Nigeria. Moreover, the sociocul-
ural or political conditions behind transitions in Brazil and China,
t the time military dictatorships and communist regimes (respec-
ively), are incompatible with the governance norms espoused in
odern democracies across Europe and North America. Further-
ore, history seems to suggest that past transitions—including
any of the case studies presented here—are based on discoveries
f new, signiﬁcant, and affordable forms of energy (usually carbon-
ntensive) or technology, leading to abundance. Yet in the future,
t may  be scarcity and “stranded assets,” rather than abundance,
hich inﬂuences decisions [167].
Fourth, and lastly, is that given these attributes of complexity,
iming, and causality, most energy transitions have been, and will
ikely continue to be, path dependent rather than revolutionary,
umulative rather than fully substitutive. To use parlance from the
ultilevel perspective and sociotechnical transitions theory, niches
ill only rarely evolve to completely dominate a landscape. Older
ources of energy—such as muscle power, animate power, wood
ower, and steam power—still remain in use throughout the world
oday, they have not entirely been replaced by fossil, nuclear, and
odern renewable energy [168,169]. Grubler himself writes that
In fact, a new solution does not evolve in a vacuum but interacts
ith existing practices and technologies [37]”. One analyst at MIT
ommented that “we’ll use renewable energy more as technology
akes it cheaper, but we’re likely to keep using more of the other
ources of energy, too [170]”. The motorized automobile behind
in part) the transition to oil in Kuwait and FFVs in Brazil is actually
 consolidation of earlier inventions fused together: the internal
ombustion engine, the wheel, the casting of steel, electric lights,
ires, the assembly line, and so on. The CHP, biomass, wind, and solar
echnology behind the transitions in Denmark and Ontario have
eneﬁtted from advances in the fossil-fuel chain including com-
ined cycle turbines, batteries, and compressed air energy storage.
Thus, transitions often appear not as an exponential line on a
raph, but as a punctuated equilibrium which dips and rises. Fast
ransitions have occurred and are capable of occurring, but they
nly become apparent when one carefully adheres to a particular
otion of signiﬁcance, society, energy resources, and energy ser-
ices, and then appreciates contextual speciﬁcity. Future energy
tudies, forecasts, and scenarios ought to make these attributes
uch more transparent and explicit.ial Science 13 (2016) 202–215
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